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Abstract 
This paper presents a general overview of the recent rise of 
mobile networks and their related applications, focusing on 
the particular case of mobile networks and technologies 
applied to the early detection and management of 
emergencies, crisis, and conflict events. It then raises the 
question of how these new developments could endanger 
the privacy and security of their end users and briefly 
reviews some of the state-of-the art proposed solutions. The 
paper concludes by stressing the need to articulate privacy-
friendly technologies to harness the full potential of mobile 
networks in dealing with conflict events. 
  The Rise of Mobile Networks  
With roughly four billion cellular subscriptions in use by 
2009, mobile phones are a success story. No other 
technology has reached a similar penetration rate 
throughout the planet in a ten-year time span. Moreover, 
our hand-held devices are increasingly becoming mobile 
sensor hubs: built-in cameras, microphones, or GPS can 
collect images, sound, and GPS data. Tiny microscopes 
can be assembled to mobile phones to collect, diagnose and 
send geolocated images of blood samples possibly infected 
with malaria or tuberculosis, and then track the spread of 
the diseases (Breslauer et al. 2009). In the social sphere, 
the number of people who use mobile-only social networks 
is growing very fast. MocoSpace—a favorite in the US— 
Mig33—increasingly popular in Asia, Africa, and the 
Middle East (25 million users)—or Peperonity are among 
the new crop of mobile social networks (Swartz 2009). 
They all offer the usual social-networking tools: chat, 
instant messaging, photo and video sharing, etc.  
In a similar way, several initiatives have been developed 
within the last few years with the purpose of providing 
accessible mobile software applications for data collection 
in the areas of early warning, situational awareness, 
emergencies and crisis response, human rights, health, or 
environment. Most of the initiatives come from nonprofit 
organizations, advocacy institutions, and relief agencies 
operating on the field in many developing countries in 
Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Some other initiatives 
come from international communities of researchers, such 
as the Information Systems for Crisis Response and 
Management (ISCRAM) community (Nieuwenhuis 2007). 
While different in scope and focus, their ultimate goal is to 
facilitate the collection and aggregation of crowdsourced, 
real-time information from local environments to support 
decision making in emergency situations such as disease 
outbreaks, natural or human-made disasters, or political 
events such as malpractices and violence in elections.  
As a result of these nascent technologies, massive 
amounts of personal data will go mobile and flow over 
mobile networks. Without proper privacy-enhancing 
technologies and protocols, individuals reporting violent 
events or violations of human rights in hot spots could be 
exposed to repression and see their lives at risk. This paper 
addresses the need to develop privacy-friendly 
technologies for mobile networks to guarantee not only the 
protection of personal data, but also the identity and the 
anonymity of people supplying those data in contexts of 
deadly conflict. In doing so, some recent examples of 
mobile, open source platforms focusing on management of 
crisis and conflict events are presented, together with new 
approaches to privacy-friendly software applications for 
mobile networks.     
Mobile Technologies for Conflict 
Management 
New horizons and opportunities for the prevention and 
management of conflicts have incredibly expanded over 
the last few years (Poblet 2008). A number of new 
software applications and tools have simultaneously 
emerged and there are teams of developers around the 
globe constantly improving them. To date, the core 
domains of application are health (also known as m-
health), emergencies and crisis management, pollution 
monitoring, and citizens’ reporting in election processes. 
Among the most utilized recently are:    
 
 Ushahidi—“testimony” in Swahili—is a free, open 
source platform that allows its users to gather 
142
distributed data via SMS, email or web and visualize it 
on a map or timeline.1 Through Ushahidi people report 
real time information of events such as political 
disruption or natural disasters and the platform 
aggregates this incoming information for use in a crisis 
response. The website was created at the beginning of 
2008 as a simple mashup, using user-generated reports 
and Google Maps to map reports of violence in Kenya 
after the post-election fallout. 
  Swift is a free and open source toolset for crowdsourced 
situational awareness.2 The first use of Swift was as a 
complement to Ushahidi to monitor the Indian 2009 
Elections. Swift embraces Semantic Web open 
standards “such as FOAF, iCal, Dublin Core, as well as 
open publishing endpoints such as Freebase” to add 
structure to crisis data and make them shareable (Swift, 
2009). 
 RapidSMS is an open source web-based platform for 
data collection, logistics coordination, and 
communication developed by the Innovations and 
Development team of UNICEF.3 With the RapidSMS 
web interface, multiple users are able to access the 
system simultaneously and to view incoming data as 
they arrive, export new data-sets, and send text 
messages to users. 
 Geochat is a system of geolocated, self-organized small-
group messaging over SMS. The service lets mobile 
phone users broadcast alerts, report on their situation, 
and coordinate around events as they unfold, linking 
field responders, headquarters, and the local community 
in geo-referenced conversation (InSTEDD 2009). 
 
The vast majority of these software applications are 
mostly SMS-based and do not necessarily need to be 
connected to the Internet to operate. They have some key 
defining features in common, which have already been 
identified in recent research on crowdsourced systems: 
open teams, mashability, unknowable, overlapping or 
conflictive requirements, continuous evolution, focus on 
operations, sufficient correctness, unstable resources, and 
emergent behaviors (Kazman and Mei 2009). 
Crowdsourcing data collection through mobile networks 
holds the promise to improve decision making in 
emergencies, crisis and conflict events, but it also poses 
important challenges, such as accuracy (of the information 
provided), or reliability and trust (of the multiple 
information sources). Moreover, crowdsourced data also 
highlight what Martucci has referred to as the “identity-
anonymity paradox”, that is, the one “which establishes the 
relationship between security, identification, and 
anonymous communications” (Martucci 2009:33). 
Farewell to our privacy? The dark side of mobile networks 
                                                 
1 http://www.ushahidi.com/ 
2 http://swiftapp.org/  
3 http://www.unicefinnovation.org/mobile-and-sms.php  
as regards our privacy cannot be neglected. In Shilton 
words:  
 
At the extreme, mobile phones could become the most 
widespread embedded surveillance tools in history. 
Imagine carrying a location-aware bug, complete with 
a camera, accelerometer, and Bluetooth stumbling, 
everywhere you go. Your phone could document your 
comings and goings, infer your activities throughout 
the day, and record whom you pass on the street or 
who engaged you in conversation. Deployed by 
governments or compelled by employers, 4 billion 
“little brothers” could be watching you (Shilton 
2009). 
Privacy-friendly software 
Recent examples of political violence in Burma, Iran or Sri 
Lanka have shown not only the growing citizens’ use of 
social media as outlets for real time reports and data on 
violent incidents (i.e. the use of Twitter after the 2009 Iran 
election) but also the exposure to government abuses when 
citizens use mobile networks for the same purposes. 
According to Martucci, ad hoc mobile networks, which 
“consist of computers, often mobile, that establish on 
demand network connections through their wireless 
interfaces, enabling instantaneous networking 
independently of the presence or aid of any central 
devices” (Martucci 2009) require the design of new 
privacy protocols: 
Thus, most of the protocols employed in wired 
networks are not suitable for ad hoc networks since 
such protocols were designed for network 
environments with defined borders and highly 
specialized devices, such as routers, servers that 
provide network addresses, firewalls, and network 
intrusion detection systems. Moreover, such an 
absence of infrastructure potentially augments the risk 
of losing control over personal information since data 
is routed and forwarded through many unknown 
devices and users can easily be monitored. Hence, 
information regarding a user’s communicating 
partners and even the contents of transmitted 
messages can be obtained by devices forwarding 
packets on the behalf of a user, if proper security 
measures are not implemented. Furthermore, data 
collection is especially not transparent in ubiquitous 
environments since invisible interfaces can greatly 
reduce the users awareness regarding when and what 
personal data is being collected by the ubiquitous 
environment (Martucci 2009:2).  
 
From this diagnosis Martucci raises the need of proper 
and trusted identifiers in ad hoc networks. In this regard, he 
establishes a connection between the lack of device 
identifiers and the presence of Sybil attacks and suggests 
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the use of self-certified Sybil-free pseudonyms. As for the 
provision of anonymous communication in ad hoc 
networks, he also proposes the Chameleon protocol, “an 
overlay mechanism that is situated in between the 
application and the transport layer” (Martucci 2009:33). 
The Chameleon protocol is said to provide “sender 
anonymity against recipients and relationship anonymity 
against local observers” (Martucci 2009:38). See also 
Ardagna et al. for a survey of existing state-of-the-art 
protection mechanisms and a privacy-preserving solution 
based on k-anonymity and multi-path communication 
(Ardagna et al. 2009). 
The discussion on possible solutions to privacy and 
anonymity in mobile networks is heated, and it takes place 
simultaneously in workshops and the Internet blogs, social 
networks, and discussion forums. To quote one example, 
Nova Spivack, Twine’s principal and Semantic Web 
expert, put in July 2009 a $10,000 challenge on how to 
“develop or port a technology that gives people 
unblockable, encrypted, anonymous Internet access for 
widely used mobile devices” (Spivack 2009). Among the 
solutions discussed within the weeks after the challenge 
was post, Spivack himself suggested porting the TOR 
platform (Anderson and Pachenko 2007) to mobile 
devices. Other replies proposed as an already existing 
solution using Bgan, a satellite Internet service,4 combining 
TOR with Truecrypt for local storage data protection, or 
developing a web-browser accessible solution that would 
enable users to establish a dynamic short-range Wi-Fi 
mesh. 
 However, there is not optimal solution at this point, 
since each of the alternatives has its pros and its cons. The 
specific circumstances of each situation will determine 
which the main priorities in each case are: privacy, 
anonymity, encryption, etc.  
The TOR platform can be a good option to provide some 
degree of anonymity to communications. The performance 
of TOR relies on the number of platform users: the more 
people use it, the better it works. The idea of TOR is to 
make the information flows intricate so as to obstacle the 
identification of the original sender. But if people are in a 
hostile situation and the system is no widespread enough, it 
might preserve the identity of the original sender, but it can 
also expose the other system users. Finally, if users encrypt 
their messages, the need of calculation power grows, and 
in mobile communications more quantity usually means 
more time delays and then, more costs.   
Bgan gives a wide range of coverage by using satellites. 
There is no need, then, to have GSM access. Bgan may be 
useful when a government decides to disconnect all its 
population from a GSM network. Shutting down the 
network is relatively easy, since antennas have limited 
coverage, are located on the ground and can be tracked. 
But with Bgan this cannot easily happen, because taking 
control of a satellite is a far more difficult task. However, 
Bgan needs special hardware equipment, which may be 
                                                 
4 http://www.tempestcom.com 
expensive and not easily concealed. Then, in certain 
remote areas a person bringing such equipment could 
easily be considered suspicious. To minimize the costs an 
alternative could be having a company to own the 
hardware and provide the service. But, then, we face the 
same risks associated with the GSM network: the only 
thing a government needs to do is to shut down the 
company and its service.  
Finally, the use of these technologies, thought to be used 
via the Internet, can severely be restricted in those 
countries where the main communication channels are 
mobile phones calls and the SMS. In addition, if messages 
are encrypted, most terminals would not be powerful 
enough to manage encryption and decryption (or a secure 
enough encryption).  
Conclusion 
Mobile networks are increasingly used for other purposes 
than regular phone calls or SMS messaging. Recent 
software developments make it possible to create mobile 
social networks as crowdsourced early warning or conflict 
management systems. 
But mobile communications are easier to keep track than 
any other digital communication. In this context, privacy 
and anonymity protocols need to be tailored to fit the 
different requirements and architectures of mobile 
networks. Currently, a number of applications already offer 
different solutions to privacy and anonymity, but none of 
the existing options were originally designed for mobile 
networks, and then need to be adapted to this new context. 
Ultimately, and specially in the case of mobile networks 
for conflict management, users will also need to make 
anonymity and anticensorship everyday habits if they want 
to keep their privacy preserved.   
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